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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This is an appeal by the Plaintiffs from the judge-
ment of the court entered pursuant to a motion by the 
Defendantsfora non-suit after the case had been call-
ed and jury selected, and after some of the Plaintiffs' 
witnesses had been cal led and heard and other certain 
offers of proof were made by Plaintiffs. The court 
granting said motion and entering judgement for the 
Defendants dismissing the action with prejudice and 
awarding the Defendants their costs of court on the 
fol lowing grounds: 
a. The evidence including the proffered addit-
ional pfoof was found insufficient to show Def-
endants were neg I igent; 
b. The evidence including the proffered addit-
ional proof shows the sole proximate cause of 
the collisionwasthenegligenceof Kim Mort-
enson, the driver of the vehicle in which the 
Plaintiff, David Patrick Alumbaugh, was riding 
from which judgment Plaintiffs now appeal. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
BETTY ANDERSON, and 
DAVID PATRICK ALUMBAUGH aka 
DAVID PATRICK ANDERSON, his 
Guardian Ad Litem, 
Plaintiffs and Appelants, 
vs. 
PARSON RED-E-MIX PAVING 
COMPANY, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, and MAX E. GREEN, 
et al, 




Civil Case No. 
10, 502 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On Apri I 22, 1966 the Defendant, Max Green, 
acting in his capacity as an employee of Parson Red-
E-Mix Paving Company, Inc. delivered a load of ready 
mix concrete to the Phi 11 ips 66 Service Station located 
at 4th North and Main Street in Brigham City, Utah. 
Immediately following the delivery, he left the exten-
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sion chutes extending to the rear and proceeded on to 
4th North Street just West of the Phi 11 ips 66 Service 
Station and parked at a point where the asphalt surface 
of the road narrows, which location is about 150 feet 
West of the West curb line of the Main Street inter-
section and 4th North. Said Vehicle was parked with 
both its left rear duals on the oiled surface of the road 
(R 186). The area immediate I y to the North of where 
the truck parked was open and unused (Defendant's 
Exhibit 4) and is general I y used for the purpose of 
parking heavy equipment and trucks. This area was 
open and avai I able on the the date in question (R 48& 49). 
Said Defendant, Max Green, then proceeded to get 
out of his truck and climb to the platform at the rear 
of the mixer and began rinsing out the excess cement 
in the chutes. The chutes projected directly East and 
extended beyond the main body of the truck 9 feet 3 
inches (R 255). There were no warning devices or red 
flags handing from the end of the chute. The time was 
approximately 4:30 P. M. and the sun was setting in the 
West. The oiled surface of the road was 27 feet wide 
at the location where the truck was parked (R 108), 
however this created a false impression, because just 
a few feet to the rear of the truck at the West edge 
of the Service Station property the entire width of the 
right of way was hard surfaced and wider making the 
entire right of way hard surface and usable for travel 
from the truck to the Main Street intersection, except 
for a few feet behind the truck. The truck was thus 
located at the time of the col I is ion in question. 
The Plaintiff, a fifteen (15) year old boy, was a 
rear seat passenger in a vehicle driven by one, Kim 
Mortenson. There was also another passenger named 
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Mark Herbert who was riding in the right front seat. 
Immediately prior to the accident, the Mortenson Veh-
icle had proceeded North Along Main Street from 2nd 
South to the 4th North and Main Street intersection in 
a norm a I and uneventfu I manner. At 4th North, the 
Mortenson vehicle pulled into the left hand storage and 
left turn lane in preparation to make a left hand turn. 
He then stopped and waited for traffic coming from the 
North to clear the intersection. Mortenson had just 
started into a left hand turn when Mark Herbert warned 
the driver to accelerate in order to avoid collision with 
a vehicle which Mortenson had failed to see coming 
from the North. In response to the warning, Mortenson 
over-accelerated and the car began to slide on some 
loose material on the road surface. While he was thus 
proceeding West with the rearend in a sideways slide 
and approximately 50 feet West of the curb line, he 
first noticed the Defendant' s truck parked on the road-
way. The driver at that point had sufficiently regained 
control and he thought that he could avoid collision by 
proceeding to the southwest and around the left side of 
the truck, but he failed to observe the steel chute ext-
ending to the rear (R 219 & 220) and although he wa'. 
not sliding he collided with the extended chutes, whic1 
chutespenatrated the right hand side of the vehicle one 
into the rear seat (Defendant's Exhibit 9) where the 
Plaintiff was riding as a passenger. As a direct result 
of the chutes entering the rear seat area, the Plaintiff 
received serious and permanent in juries, the extent of 
which are not a part of this appeal. 
POINT# I 
The court erred in holding Plaintiffs evidence failed 
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to show neg I igence on the part of Defendants. The 
evidence of the Plaintiff showed that the Defendant, 
Max Green, was negligent in the fol lowing respects: 
1. That he parked his truck with the left hand side 
onto the traveled portion and the hard surfaced area 
of the street at a location where such parking was pro-
hibited by Section 41-6-101, Utah Code, providing 
as fol lows: 
"Upon any highway outside of a business or resi-
dence district no person shal I stop, park, or leave 
standing any vehicle, whether attended or unatt-
ended, upon the paved or main traveled part of 
the highway when it is practical to stop, park, or 
so leave such vehicle off such part of said high-
way, but in every event an unobstructed width 
of the highway opposite a standing vehi de shal I 
be left for the free passage of other vehicles and 
a clear view of such stopped vehicle shall be 
available from a distance of 200 feet in each dir-
ection upon such highway. 
This section shal I not apply to the driver of any 
vehicle which is disabled while on the paved or 
main traveled portion of a highway in such mann-
er and to such extent that it is impossible to avoid 
stopping and temporarily leaving such disabled 
vehicle in such position. 11 
The area was neither being used for residential or 
commercial, nevertheless, said property had been zon-
ed commercial and abutting there to residential. It is 
Plaintiffs position that the actual conditions of the use 
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of the property should be controlling rather than the 
availability created by a zoning statute. The adjoin-
ing property in this case was a vacant lot graveled and 
used to park equipment. In a similar case Hil I yard vs. 
Utah By-Products Co., lU (2d) 143, 263 P. 2d 287, 
the statute was applied as to availability to park off 
the road. 
In the case of Hil I yard vs. Utah By-Products the 
factual situation was that the Defendant had partially 
driven his vehicle into a private driveway and the Court 
determined that where the space was available he had 
a duty to drive so that his entire vehicle was off the 
road. This case apparently in applying the statutory 
provision took into consideration the availability of an 
area in which to pull the truck entirely off the road 
rather than applying the narrow construction, as there 
was a single residence that they were in fact in a resi-
dential area which would allow for parking on the travel 
portion, however the court held it did apply based on 
availability of space off the roadway to park. 
In this case on appeal there was not only a drive-
way available but an entire graveled lot and further 
there was no real need to stop at this location as the De-
fendant's own testimony is: 11 { R41) That it was a 10 min-
ute drive from the location to the Parson Red-E-Mix yards 
where equipment was available to take care of clean 
up and to dispose of any excess materials he may have 
had. II 
139 P 2d 76 Takako et al vs. Ede et al 
In that Ede case the defendant had fa i I ed to pu 11 com-
plete I y into a parking place at the side of a snow packed 
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road. The rear end of the car extended some 5 feet out of 
the parking area into the traveled portion of the road. An-
other vehicle had been sliding out of control for a dist-
ance of 90 feet and was sti II out of control when it col li-
ded with the defendant's vehicle. The plaintiff was 
a pedestrian standing at the other side of the parked 
vehicle and was injured as a result of the collision, 
driving the defendants vehicle into her. 
"The appe II ant argues that the efficient and prox-
imate cause of the accident was the skidding of the 
Ede car. It is quite true that had not the Ede car ,gone 
out of control it probably would not have struck appell-
ant' s car. Neve rt he less, as in the case of Pastene v. 
Adams, 49 Cal. 87, the negligent piling of the lumber 
in the streetdidnotcause the trucktobe driven against 
it, thereby toppling over and injuring the plaintiff, 
but the court in that instance held that pi I ing lumber 
in such a fashion was concurring negligence in that it 
concurred with the negligence of thedriverofthetruck 
and the judgement against the defendant was sustained. 
This court cannot say that the situation here presented 
is at all different than that in the Pastene case. In the 
present case the alleged negligent parking by appell-
ant was a question of fact and was found by the jury 
to be a continuing negligence and a violation of the 
Motor Vehicle Code, St. 1935, p. 93, and therefore 
was a concurring negligence with that of the defendant 
Ede." 
The Court erred in holding that Section 41-6-101 
was not applicable in this case for the erroneous reason 
that the area was commercial or residential, and not 
the actual facts existing, which were the said property 
was not being used for either commercial or residential 
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purposes even though the Brigham City zoning ordin-
ance makes the area avai I able for that type of develop-
ment. The lower court failed to take into considera-
tion the availability of off street parking which in the 
instant case shows an open graveled yard on the north 
side (Defendant's Exhibit 4 - photo of open parking 
area) and vacant lots on the other side. The above was 
the condition of the entire distance from Main Street to 
First West, except for the property East of where the 
collision occurred where there was a service station on 
the one corner. 
It is the Plaintiff's position that such an interpreta-
tion would do away with the basic purpose of the stat-
ute in that the general public traveling on the road 
would not be apprised except by the actual surrounding 
conditions. It seems clear in giving the particular stat-
ute in question this interpretation wil I lend itself to the 
purpose for the passing of all traffic regulations, that 
is, the safety and convenience of the general public in 
the use of the roads. It therfore fol lows that the act-
ual existing conditions must be taken into consider-
ation and not merely the passing of a zoning ordin-
ance which can at best make certain property avail-
able for commercial and residential development. The 
control ling factor should be, was it being used for 
residential or commercial purposes at the time in ques-
tion? The record makes it quite clear that it was not; 
and therefore the Plaintiff's contention is that Section 
41-6-101 applies in the above entitled case and that 
the Defendant was in violation of said section. 
The affirmative evidence shows that the adjoining 
property was available for parking and that the immed-
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iate area was not being used for commercial nor resid-
ential purposes. In addition to being in violation of the 
above section, the defendants parking in the above loc-
ation was dangerous and negligent because of its prox-
imity with the Main Street intersection. It was forsee-
able that vehicles would come off a busy Main Street 
intersection at such speeds that the parking of the 
truck in this location would create an unreasonable 
hazard. Additional facts that should have been con-
sidered by a reasonable and prudent person was that at 
the given time of day, to wit: 4:30 p. m., the setting 
sun caused interference with the normal vision of dri-
vers and further that because of the increased width of 
the hard surfaced road immediately to the rear, drivers 
coming from Main Street would have the impression 
that there was more roadway available than in fact 
there was. 
Without reference to the statutory violation - Hill-
yard Case, 263 Pacific 287 290, -
"The parking of a vehicle upon the paved or travel 
portion of a highway is generally regarded as a haz-
ard to traffic thereon. 11 
Therefore it was only proper for the jury to determine 
if there was an emergency justifing defendants park-
ing in the location in question. The evidence show-
ed no pressing need to park in this location. The avail-
ability of adjoining space on which parking could be 
made was not control led by the zoning ordinance and 
did not change the actual use of the property. It was 
neither commercial nor residential and therefore the 
statutory provisions should be applied. 
2. Violation of Brigham City Ordinance 256 Sec-
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tion 136 which provides as follows: 
"No person shal I drive any vehicle with a load or 
object upon such vehicle extending four feet or 
more beyond the bed or body of said vehicle with-
out having during daytime a red flag at least 16 
inches square attached at the extreme rear end of 
the load or object so protruding, and so hung that 
the entire area is visible to the driver of a vehicle 
approaching from the rear . . . " 
The evidence shows that the cement chute extended 
9 feet 3 inches, the ordinance provides that any ext-
ension over 4 feet from the body of the truck should 
have a red flag 16 inches square for the purpose of 
giving warni.:g to vehicles approaching from the rear. 
In this case there were no flags. The only material 
difference in the BrighamCityOrdinanceand the State 
Code on this subject is that the Brigham City ordinance 
provides for the projection to be an object or a portion 
of the load while Section 41-6-128 provides for the ext-
ension of the load. 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 Section 41-6-128 which 
provides as fol lows: 
"Whenever the load upon any vehicle extends to 
the rear four feet or more beyond the bed or body 
of such vehicle there shall be displayed a the ext-
reme rear end of the load, at the times specified 
in section 41-6-118 hereof, a red light or lantern 
plainly visible from a distance of at least 500 feet 
to the sides and rear. The red I ight or I antern re-
quired under this section shall be in addition to 
the red rear light required upon every vehicle. 
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At any other time there shal I be displayed at the 
extreme rear end of such load a red flag or cloth 
not less than 12 inches square, and so hung that 
the entire area is visible to the driver of a vehicle 
approaching from the rear. 11 
It seems apparent that the legislature in passing 
this particular section was aware of the dangerous con-
dition created by projecting objects and that motorists 
would, unless special warning devices were placed on 
them, fail to observe them and therefore the situation 
which existed here was the actual situation foreseen 
by the legislature, and therefore the ordinance and 
State Code section should be applied in determining 
the negligence of the Defendant. 
The Court erred further in holding that provmon 
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-128 was not applicable 
to the Defendant for the following reason: 
That the undisputed evidence shows that the entire 
truck was parked within the right of way of the road. 
That the extension of the chutes was stipulated to be 
9 feet 3 inches from the main body of the truck (R 225). 
Further, that the chutes when in position for traveling 
and folded up did not extend beyond the body of the 
truck but when unfolded and extended as they were 
in this case, extended 9 feet 3 inches to the rear. 
The Brigham City ordinance and the State Code prov-
ides that any extension beyond 4 feet requires a red 
flag not less than 12 and 16 inches square be hung so 
that the entire area is visible to a driver approaching 
from the rear. In this case there was no red flag at the 
end of the chute and the evidence shows that the direct 
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cause of the Plaintiff's in juries was the entry of the 
chute into the rear portion of the vehicle, the area in 
which the Plaintiff was riding as a guest passenger. 
POINT II 
PROXIMATE CAUSE 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SOLE 
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE PLAIN TIFF'S INJURIES 
WAS THE NEGLIGENCE OF KIM MORTENSON, THE 
DRIVER, OF THE VEHICLE IN WHICH THE PLAINTIFF 
WAS RIDING. It was stipulated by the Defendant 
for the purpose of his motion that the facts showed 
a lack of contributory neg I igence on the part of the 
Plaintiff and therefore it is not argued in this brief. 
It is admitted that there was neg I igence on the part of 
Kim Mortenson that concurred with the negligence of 
the Defendant in causing the injuries, but that except 
for the concurring negligence of the Defendant there 
would have been no collision. 
As relates to the proximate cause of the above col 1-
ision Kim Mortenson testified (R 230) that he did see the 
truck prior to the collision, that in his opinion he had 
regained sufficient control that he would be able to 
avoid the col I is ion, but denies that he ever observed 
the extended chute prior to the col I iding with it. 
65 C. J. S. Negligence Section 19 (c) P 418-420 
states as fol lows: 
"The generally accepted view is that violation of 
a statutory duty constitutes neg I igence, neg I igence as 
a matter of law, or, according to the decisions on the 
question, negligence per se, for the reason that non-
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observance of what the legislature has prescribed as a 
suitable precaution is failure to observe that care which 
an ordinarily prudent man would observe, and, when 
the state regards certain acts as so liable to injure oth-
ers as to justify their absolute prohibition, doing the 
forbidden act is a breach of duty with respect to those 
who may be injured thereby; or, as it has been other-
wise expressed, when the standard of care is fixed by 
law, failure to conform to such standard is neg I igence. 
According to this view it is immaterial, where a sta-
tute has been violated, whether the act or omission 
constiiting such violation would have been regarded 
as negligence in the absence of any statute on the sub-
ject or whether there was, as a matter of fact, any 
reason to anticipate that injury would result from such 
violation." 
In addition to the above being in violation for the 
statutory prohibition of al lowing the extension out, 
there were additional reasons why the al lowing of the 
extension was hazardous which are as follows: 
l. That because of the proximity of the truck to 
the corner, cars which could be expected to make 
the turnoff from Main Street on to 4th North wou Id 
only have a short distance in which to make their obs-
ervation thereby making it more probable that drivers 
would fail to see the extended chutes. Also because 
of the time of day and the setting of the sun, the chu-
tes location would be within the location of the sha-
dow cast by the truck itself and the sun would be shin-
ing into the eyes of the drivers coming from the East, 
al I of which factors were apparent to any prudent per-
son making reasonable observations. 
For the above reasons the court committed an error 
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in finding that the Plaintiff's evidence was void of 
any facts upon which a reasonable person could find 
that the Defendant was guilty of negligence. 
CONCLUSION 
In final conclusion the evidence taken in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff shows that: 
1. There was evidence on which the jury could 
have reasonably concluded that the acts of defend-
ant constituted negligence. That said acts of neg I igence 
were a concurring and contributing cause without which 
the injuries to the plaintiff would not have occurred 
and therefore the court erred in taking this question 
from the jury. · 
2. That there was sufficient evidence that the acts 
of negligence of Kim Mortenson, although contributing 
to the injuries of the plaintiff, in and of themselves, 
would not have caused the injury to the plaintiff and 
therefore the court erred in finding that said neg I igence 
was the sole proximate cause as a matter of law, and 
therfore plaintiff prays that the judgement of the court 
be set aside and the mater be returned to the District 
Court and a new trial ordered and that the appellent be 
awarded costs on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Dale M. Dorius, Esq., 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
and Appe 11 ants 
